Compromise in cooperative game and the VIKOR method
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.2298/YJOR0902225OKeywords:
multicriteria decision making, cooperative game, compromise, VIKOR methodAbstract
Five approaches in conflict resolution are distinguished, based on cooperativeness and aggressiveness in resolving conflict. Compromise based on cooperativeness is emphasized here as a solution in conflict resolution. Cooperative game theory oriented towards aiding the conflict resolution is considered and the compromise value for TU(transferable utility)-game is presented. The method VIKOR could be applied to determine compromise solution of a multicriteria decision making problem with noncommensurable and conflicting criteria. Compromise is considered as an intermediate state between conflicting objectives or criteria reached by mutual concession. The applicability of the cooperative game theory and the VIKOR method for conflict resolution is illustrated.References
Bell, D.E., Raiffa, H., Tversky, A. (1989) Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions in decision theory. Cambridge, itd: Cambridge University Press / CUP, str. 1-30
Bilbao, J.M., Jiménez-Losada, A., Lebrón, E., Tijs, S.H. (2002) The τ-value for games on matroids. TOP, 10 (1) 67-81
Branzei, R., Dimitrov, D., Tijs, S. (2004) Hypercubes and compromise values for cooperative fuzzy games. European Journal of Operational Research, 155(3): 733
Butler, L.C.T., Rothstein, A. On conflict and consensus. http://www.consensus.net
Curiel, I. (1997) Cooperative game theory and applications. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Duckstein, L., Opricovic, S. (1980) Multiobjective optimization in river basin development. Water Resources Research, 16(1): 14
Escobar, M.T., Moreno-Jimenez, J.M. (2002) A linkage between the Analytic Hierarchy Process and the Compromise Programming Models. Omega, 30(5): 359
Fang, L., Hipel, K.W., Kilgour, D.M. (1993) Interactive decision making: The graph model for conflict resolution. New York: Wiley
Ferguson, T. Game theory: Games in coalitional form. http://www.math.ucla.edu
Fraser, N.M., Hipel, K.W. (1984) Conflict analysis: Models and resolutions. New York: North Holland
Hanany, E., Kilgour, D.M., Gerchak, Y. (2007) Final-offer arbitration and risk aversion in bargaining. Management Science, 53, (11), 1785-1792
Jelassi, M.T., Kersten, G.E., Zionts, S. (1990) An introduction to group decision and negotiation support. u: Bana C., Costa [ur.] Readings in Multiple Criteria Decision Aid, Heidelberg: Springer, str. 537-568
Kersten, G.E. (1997) Support for group decisions and negotiations - An overview. Springer-Verlag, 332-346
Murphy, P. (1991) Game theory models for organizational/public conflict. Canadian Journal of Communication, 16 (2), http://www.cjc-online.ca/archive.php
Opricovic, S., Tzeng, G.H. (2007) Extended VIKOR method in comparison with outranking methods. European Journal of Operational Research, 178(2): 514-529
Opricović, S., Tzeng, G.H. (2004) Compromise solution by MCDM methods: A comparative analysis of VIKOR and TOPSIS. European journal of operational research, 156 (2): 445-455
Pareto, V. (1896) Cours d'Economie Politique. Geneva: Droz
Quant, M., Borm, P., Reijnierse, H., van Velzen, B. (2003) Compromise stable TU-games. Tilburg University, Discussion paper br. 2003-55
Tijs, S., Otten, G. (1993) Compromise values in cooperative game theory. Top, 1(1): 1
Timmer, J. (2005) The compromise value for cooperative games with random payoffs. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Physica Verlag, 64 (1) 95-106
Yu, P.L. (1990) Forming winning strategies: An integrated theory of habitual domains. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag
Yu, P.L. (1973) A class of solutions for group decision problems. Management Science, 19(8): 936
Zadeh, L.A. (1963) Optimality and non-scalar-valued performance criteria. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, AC-8 (1) 59-60
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) YUJOR
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
